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I appreciate this opportunityto
share with you some of my
thoughts on an issue which is
dear to the hearts of commercial
bankers, bond dealers, bro-
kerage firms and Federal Reserve
watchers throughout theworld-
howto evaluate Federal Reserve
actions on the basis of current
money market conditions. It is
my opinion that there continues
to be a great deal of confusion in
both banking circles and the
general public about how the
Federal Reserve participates in
money markets in the process of
achieving its economic stabiliza-
tion goals.
There are two major groups of
opinion about how to interpret
and evaluate money market con-
ditions. One group looks at the
price of money and credit mea-
sured by interest rates, and the
other group looks at the quantity
of money and credit. Ifwe lived
in a world of complete knowl-
edge about the structure of our
economic universe, both the in-
terest rate approach and the
money and credit approach
would give us substantially the
same information. Unfortunately,
such is not the case. We live in a
world where we have an overa-
bundance of facts, and a scarcity
of understanding, about various
markets in the economy and
their interaction with one an-
other. In these circumstances,
we need guidelines, based upon
experience and research, to
serve as indicators of the effects
of one market on another-in
this case the effect of money
markets on the rest of the
economy.
Money market rates
Those who focus on short-term
interest rates in evaluating
money market conditions have a
view of the world which goes
something like this: Rising in-
terest rates increase the cost of
borrowed funds, and thus reduce
the demand for those goods
which are sensitive to interest
rates, such as business invest-
ment in plant and equipment,
and consumer spending for du-
rable goods-automobiles, major
appliances, and, of course, the
most durable consumer good of
all-housing. According to this
view of the world, high interest
rates forecast a slowdown in
economic activity, while low
rates are associated with an ex-
pansion in economic activity.
At the same time, interest rate
watchers believe the primary
cause of interest rate movements
is related to the behavior of the
Federal Reserve in controlling the
supply of funds. They believe
that high or rising interest rates
are due mainly to restrictive Fed-
eral Reserve actions, while low or
3 ~ ----------------------------falling interest rates are due to
easing Federal Reserve actions.
This interestrate approach to
analyzing money market condi-
tions was widely accepted until
recent years. However, it has
gradually lost favor as a measure
of both Federal Reserve actions
and an indicator of monetary
influences on the rest of the
economy, because the evidence
simply has not supported this
relationship. Until very recently,
the highest interest rates in re-
cent U.S. history were experi-
enced in the 1969 credit crunch.
That should have been trans-
lated, according to this prescrip-
tion, into the worst recession in
recent U.S. history. As a matter
of fact, although 1970 was a pe-
riod of recession it was by his-
toric standards a mild one. Going
back further, we observe that
high and rising interest rates
were only weakly related to slow-
downs in the economy. The great
depression of the early 1930's
was associated with the lowest
interest rates in U.S. history, and
they did not do much to stimu-
late an economic recovery.
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Why are interest rates such a
poor indicator of the effects of
the monetary sector on the rest
of the economy? The reason is
fairly straightforward. Interest
rates, as the price of money, are
determined not only by the
supply of funds made available
by the Federal Reserve System
but also by the demand for funds
determined by various sectors of
the economy. This demand can
be broken into two components
-a business cycle element and
an inflation expectations ele-
ment. Over the business cycle,
the demand for funds to meet
the needs of trade and finance
tends to push rates up sharply
during the boom and to push
them down during a business
recession. The research evidence
developed on this issue strongly
suggests that the cyclic variations
in money market rates are domi-
nated by business demand rather
than by Federal Reserve policy.
However, the systematic counter-
cyclic movement of short rates-
high in boom periods and low in
recession periods-has misled
many people into interpreting it
as a reliable indicator of Federal
Reserve actions.
The second element in deter-
mining money market rates is
inflation expectations. Various
researchers have found that
under most circumstances every
one percent increase in inflation
expectations is associated with
roughly a one percent increase in
interest rates. Interest rates now,
and in 1969 at the peak of the last
business cycle, are much higher
than in previous business cycle
peaks, due to the much higher
level of inflation we have had
over the last five years in compar-
ison with previous business cy-
cles.
In this circumstance, high in-
terest rates are not as depressing
on business investment or other
interest sensitive spending. The
borrowers of these funds expect
to pay back with dollars of a
lower purchasing power, and the
higher interest rate merely com-
pensates the lender for the de-
cline in the real value of his
capital. Thus, the real interest
rate, the market rate adjusted to
eliminate the inflation premium,
is only moderately higher now
than in previous business cycles.
Let me give you some examples
using the four to six months
commercial paper rate-the
market rate peak in October 1959
was 4.7 percent; in October 1966,
6.0 percent; in December 1969,
8.8 percent; and August 1973,
10.3 percent. However, if we
make the reasonable assumption
that expectations of inflation over
the next three to six months are
approximately determined by the
actual inflation of the past year,
q1 t,
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Percent then the real interest rate would
have been about as follows: In
October, 1959,4 percent; in
October 1966, 4 percent; in De-
cember 1969, 4 percent; and in
August 1973, 5 percent. These
calculations should not be taken
as exact because they are only
indirect measures of inflation
expectations. Nevertheless, they
provide a rough indication of the
increasing gap between the ob-
served money market interest
rate and the real rate in this
period of long-term inflation. It is
the existence of the inflation
premium that has convinced
many observers that money
market rates are poor indicators
both of Federal Reserve actions
and of monetary influences upon
the economy.
Money and credit aggregates
Our attention has been focused
increasingly on money and credit
aggregates as the more appro-
priate measures of money market
conditionsandtheireffectson the
economy. It is the quantityof
money and credit which mea-
sures the amount of financing
available. Leaving aside the theo-
retical arguments of the Keyne-
sians and monetarists, why
should we rely upon the price of
money, which is only an indirect
and imperfect indicator, when
we have the direct evidence of
the activity in money and finan-
cial markets? In the present infla-
tionary period, I believe that the
5quantity of money and credit
made available to the market,
rather than its price, is the more
reliable indicator in this reg-
ard.Under normal circumstances,
money and credit move in the
same direction over the business
cycle and, therefore, transmit the
same information about mone-
tary influences. However, there
have been specific episodes
when measures of credit (such as
bank loans and investments) and
measuresof money (such as the
now-famous Ml-currency and
demand deposits in the hands of
the public) have either gone in
opposite directions or, if in the
same direction, at different rates
of change. In these circum-
stances, money watchers and
credit watchers may end up eval-
uating the actions of the Federal
Reserve and the consequent ef-
fects on the rest of the economy
differently. When such differ-
ences arise we need a criterion
for selecting one over the other.
A reasonable criterion is to select
the aggregate which is least influ-
enced by special institutional fac-
tors. On this basis a monetary
aggregate would seem to be su-
perior to a credit aggregate.
Bank credit
Total credit is often measured in
terms of bank credit, but banks
are not the only source of credit
available to the economy. Other
sources include the commercial
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paper market, savings and loan
associations, investment banks
and capital markets. Bank credit
represents a sufficiently large
share of the total that it is typi-
cally a useful indicator of the
total movement of credit. How-
ever, when there are major insti-
tutional forces at work which
make bank credit either unusu-
ally attractive or unusually hard
to get, it will not necessarily be a
good measure of total credit. It is
precisely at these times when
credit and money move in dif-
ferent directions. Let me illus-
trate. Bank credit slowed sharply
in 1966 and again in 1969. In the
view of most observers this oc-
curred because market interest
rates increased above the ceiling
rates on time deposits permitted
under Federal Reserve Regulation
Q. This caused a substantial
runoff of commercial bank de-
posits into money market instru-
ments which were not subject to
Regulation Q. As a result of the
runoff of deposits, bank credit in
the second half of 1966 increased
at only a 2 percent annual rate,
down substantially from the 10
percent rate ofthe previous two
and one-half years. In 1969, bank
credit grew by 3 percent versus
11 percent in the two previous
years.
While this slowing in the growth
of bank credit may have been a
severe handicap to small busi-
nessmen who only had commer-
cial banks as a source of financ-
ing, large businesses with access
to the commercial paper, money
and capital markets were able to
meet their needs. For example,
in the second half of 1966, the
volume of commercial paper in-
creased at a 43 percent annual
rate, up from 18 percent in the
previous two and one-half years.
In 1969, commercial paper in-
creased 52 percent, more than
double the growth of the pre-
vious two years.
Thus, the major effect of Regula-
tion Q was to distort the normal
channels through which credit
was made available to the econ-
omy, rather than changing the
total amount of credit. A person
viewing bank credit in 1966 or
1969 would have asserted that the
degree of Federal Reserve restric-
tion on the economy was quite
severe. While the Federal Re-
serve was in fact being restric-
tive, it was not as restrictive as
the movement in bank credit
implied. The 1967 downturn in
the economy was so mild that it
was not even labeled a recession
and the 1970 downturn was the




In early 1973 bank credit also was
a misleading indicator, but in the
opposite direction from the two
previous cases. In the first
quarter of this year money
market interest rates rose relative
to the prime rate, making bank
credit the cheapest alternative
source of funds. As a result, we
saw a rapid 18 percent rate of
growth in total loans and invest-
ments at commercial banks. This
was a substantial acceleration
from the 12 percent growth rate
of the two previous years. During
the same six month period, how-
ever, there was virtually no
growth in commercial paper and
only a moderate supply of new
corporate debt. While the overall
expansion of credit was rapid, it
certainly was not as rapid as bank
credit figures indicated.
Money stock
This leads us to the last money
market indicator, which is the
money stock. There are a
number of alternative measures
of the money stock: M, which is
currency and demand deposits in
the hands of the nonbank public,
M2 which adds to M, the time
deposits of commercial banks
exclusive of large CD's, and M3
which adds to M2 the time de-
posits of thrift institutions. In
recent years, the M2 and M3
definitions of money have suf-
fered from the same institutional
problem as bank credit. Thus, M,
is the preferred measure at this
time. The money stock is deter-
mined by the interactions of
three groups of decision makers:
1) the Federal Reserve, 2) the
commercial banks and 3) the
general public.
The role of the Federal Reserve is
to determine the monetary base
for the entire financial system.
The term monetary base refers to
the balance sheet of the Federal
Reserve. On the asset side it is
dominated by the portfolio of
government securities which the
Federal Reserve buys and sells in
the open market. On the liability
side it consists mainly of Federal
Reserve notes (currency) and the
deposits of member banks which
represent their basic required
reserves against their own
checking accounts and time de-
posits. The unique role of the
Federal Reserve is its ability to
expand or contract its balance
sheet as a deliberate act of
policy. The Federal Reserve as a
central bank has responsibility
for issuing currency and regu-
lating the reserves of member
banks. It performs this function
mainly by monetizing govern-
ment debt, that is, buying gov-
ernment securities and paying for
them with newly created deposits
which become the reserves of
member banks. In this way, the
Federal Reserve provides the
underlying source of liquidity to
the entire financial system.
The behavior of banks and the
general public, in response to
the actions of the Federal Re-
serve, leads to an adjustment in
their portfolio of assets. The
banks have a desired level of
liquidity on the basis of interest
rates and the volume of deposits.
The public has a desired level of
liquidity on the basis of a variety
of factors related to interest
rates, the frequency of salary
payments, etc. As the banks and
the public respond to changes in
the monetary base, the money
stock is uniquely determined.
Most observers have been im-
pressed by the research of recent
years which indicates that Federal
Reserve actions in determining
the monetary base play the domi-
nant role in determining the
money supply. There is only one
major episode when the actions
of the public rather than the
Federal Reserve dominated the
money stock. This was during the
bank panic of the early 1930's,
when the public had a substantial
and permanent increase in its
demand for currency relative to
other assets. As a result, the
increase in the monetary base all








Money Stock (M 1)
/
- Monetary Base
needs of the public rather than
reserve needs of the member
banks. At all other times, Federal
Reserve control of the monetary
base has dominated movements
in the money supply.
The evidence of Federal Reserve
control of money and the impact
of money on the economy has
been developed in an impressive
way, not only with respect to the
United States in the postwar pe-
riod, but back as far as reliable
data on the nation's money and
income go. In addition, studies
using the data of other industrial
countries also strongly support
the strategic role of money as an




Federal Reserve, by controlling monetary base,
determines M, growth and thus influences economy
o
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In spite ofthe importance which
is increasingly accorded to
money, we must try to avoid a
money myopia. Some people
treat every wiggle in the money
supply series as a source of im-
portant information about the
future course of the economy.
This is wrong and should be
avoided. The weekly and even
monthly money supply data con-
tain a large random element. The
money supply behaves like a dog
being walked by his master. The
dog will dart in and out, to and
fro, always straining at its leash to
get to the nearest fire hydrant or
bush, while the man will walk1
I
" I
speculation took the form of
selling dollar demand deposits
to, for example, the German cen-
tral bank to acquire Deutsche-
mark deposits. The German and
other central banks purchased
Treasury bills with these newly
acquired dollars, causing an in-
flow of funds to the U.S.
Treasury and a consequent in-
crease in Treasury deposits at
U.S. banks. In the first quarter,
this transfer of deposits from the
public to the U.S. Treasury re-
duced the money supply. In the
second quarter the Treasury
worked its balances down to
more normal levels, resulting in a
rise in private demand deposits
and hence a rise in the money
supply. Ifone focused on money
supply figures alone during the
first half of this year, he would
have obtained a misleading im-
pression regarding Federal Re-
serve intentions. However, if one
focused on the monetary base,
which is dominated by the Fed's
portfolio of financial assets, he
would have gained a much
clearer view of the System's ulti-
mate influence on the money
stock.
In the first quarter of this year,
there was an international mone-
tary crisis which caused many
people, including some who held
U.S. dollar deposits, to speculate
about-a-dollardevcHuation. This
The most probable cause of this
stop-go movement in the money
stock was a statistical fluke re-
lated to Treasury deposits
commercial banks. Treasury
deposits are not included in the
money supply data for the simple
reason that they are not a mea-
sure ofthe liquidity of the private
sector of the economy.
supply grew in excess of a 10
percent annual rate, many
people were surprised and dis-
turbed at the apparent erratic
behavior of the Federal Reserve,
and expressed heightened fears
about inflation.
However, this specific episode
was not due to a change in
Federal Reserve policy. If one
looked at the rate which the
Federal Reserve was expanding
its assets-in the form of the
monetary base-he would have
found that the underlying forces
which determine the money
supply were developing at the
same rate in both the first and
second quarters. Nor was there a
permanent shift in the desire of
the public or the banks to hold
more liquidity.
There have been a few occasions
when even a longer-run measure
of money growth has been mis-
leading. We had such an example
in the first half of this year. In the
first quarter of 1973, the money
supply grew at a 1.7 percent
annual rate, and many people
interpreted this as monetary ov-
erkill and excessive Federal Re-
serve restriction on the
economy. Consequently, when
in the secondquarter the money
straight on his course. If we
follow the weekly and monthly
data we are following the dog's
path, when we should be con-
centrating on the man. That re-
quires us to look at the money
supply data in perspective, aver-
aging out its weekly and monthly
erratic variations to understand
the underlying trend which alone
has an important impact on the
economy. Our research and that
of others in the Federal Reserve
System indicate that it t,akes at
least a six months sustained
change in the growth of the
money supply to cause a change
in general economic activity. For
this reason, the Federal Reserve
has not attempted to rigidly con-
trol the money stock over a pe-
riod of one or two months. Such
short-run control would have led
to very sharp swings in in-
terest rates, with the possibility













I I. .......iIIIICurrent developments
My intention to this point has
been to clarify the various ways
of looking at money market con-
ditions and to give you my rea-
sons for considering one way
superior to another. I would now
like to apply this information to
an analysis of current money
market conditions. Short-term
interest rates have in the last
month reached their highest
level in this century. The Fed
funds rate has ranged between
10112 and 11 percent. The prime
rate has reached 934 percent and
even the Federal Reserve dis-
count rate of 7112 percent is at an
historic high. These rates all rep-
resent substantial increases from
those reported as recently as
early July.
We have always had sharp in-
creases in money market interest
rates during the expansion phase
of the business cycle. That is
what is happening now. What is
new about the current situation
is that the levels these rates are
reaching represent historic highs.
Concern has been expressed in
some quarters about what this
implies about the future course
of the economy.
In light of what 1have said pre-
viously, the current historic high
interest rates would appear to be
related to the current high rate of
inflation which people expect to
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continue over the next six to
twelve months. It is only natural
that lenders will demand, and
borrowers will be prepared to
pay, a high rate of interest on
short-term funds when both
groups of people expect a high
rate of inflation over the life of
the money market instrument. As
Arthur Burns, Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, said on
August 3, before the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee of Congress,
"the underlying reason for the
high level of interest rates is the
persistence of inflation since
1965.1nflationary expectations
have by now become fairly well
entrenched in the calculations of
both lenders and borrowers."
When this inflation premium is
subtracted from the current
money market rates, the real rate
of interest no longer looks so
high.
I believe that under the present
circumstances the M, definition
of the money stock-currency
and demand deposits in the
hands of the non-bank public-is
the best overall measure of
money market conditions. As
with any indicator, it is not per-
fect and can, on occasions, give
misleading information as in the
first quarterof this year. How-
ever, if we look at the money
stock in perspective, it has grown
in excess of 8 percent in the last
year and a half. This has been
fueled by an 8 percent growth in
the monetary base. Thus, the
underlying thrust of monetary •
policy and, therefore, the under-
lying availability of money and
credit to the economy did not
slow down in the first half of
1973. It is this expansion which
concerned me.
Very recent evidence indicates a
slowing in the growth of the
monetary base and money stock.
In the months of July and August
the growth rate in both indicators
was down to a 5.5 percent annual
rate. If this slowdown continues,
the second half of 1973 may rep-
resent a real period of monetary •
restriction and, therefore, a slow-
down in the growth of credit
made available to the private
sector and, eventually, in the rate
of inflation.
Credit crunch
I would like to close with a
comment on the so-called "credit
crunch" phenomena. High in-
terest rates should not be con-
fused with a credit crunch. A
crunch is a condition where
funds are not available to many
classes of borrowers at any price.
High interest rates on the other
hand are merely a way of ra-
tioning the available funds to
those who are willing to pay the
higher prices. We had a severe
credit crunch in 1966 and a lessI
'f
severe but, nevertheless, painful
one in 1969. While both of these
were associated with relatively
high interest rates, they were not
directly caused by high interest
rates. Rather, they were caused
by the fact that certain financial
regulations and institutions
impeded the smooth allocation
function of financial markets.
In the case of commercial banks
it was Federal Reserve Regulation
Q which caused a severe disin-
termediation when market rates
exceeded the Q ceilings. The
1"966 crunch was eased only when
the banks were able to tap an
alternative source of funds not
subject to Q ceilings, the Euro-
dollar market, and the crunch
was eliminated only when in-
terest rates fell below the Q
ceiling. A similar experience oc-
curred in 1969. However, the
crunch was less severe then be-
cause the banks, haVing already
gone through this experience
once, were prepared to shift to
the Eurodollar market rather
qUickly. In addition, they devel-
oped domestic institutional de-
vices, specifically, by issuing
commercial paper through one-
bank holding company subsidi-
aries to ease the constraints of
Regulation Q. In 1973 the Federal
Reserve has suspended Regula-
tion Q ceilings on large deposits
-the type most sensitive to in-
terest rate change. Thus, a major
cause of past credit crunches has
been eliminated for many com-
mercial banks.
Conclusion
I have tried in the time allotted to
give you a brief overview of how
money market conditions trans-
late themselves into broader
statements about monetary
policy and its effects on eco-
nomic activity. We have found
that money market interest rates
have become an unreliable guide
because of the emergence of a
long-term inflationary trend and
the resulting inflation premium
in interest rates. A 10% percent
interest rate simply does not
mean the same when the infla-
tion rate is 6 percent or more as
it does when the inflation rate is
2 or 3 percent. Nevertheless, the
remarks of Chairman Burns are
worth repeating, "the simple
truth (is) that inflation and high
interest rates go together and
that both the one and the other
pose perils for economic and
social stability in our country."
The movement in the money and
credit aggregates is a more reli-
able indicator of both Federal
Reserve actions and their impact
on the rest of the economy. On
those few occasions when money
and credit transmit different in-
formation about money market
conditions, the money series is
superior to the credit series be-
cause institutional factors tend to
distort the credit measure more
than the money stock. The un-
derlying movement in the money
stock is dominated by the mone-
tary base which, in essence, rep-
resents the assets of the Federal
Reserve System, and is the finan-
cial constraint on the entire
economy. The Federal Reserve,
by controlling the monetary
base, determines the trend
growth in the money supply and
through this control has its influ-
ence on general economic ac-
tivity.
With regard to the larger ques-
tion of what monetary policy
should be, I think the growth in
money must be targeted in terms
of our overall financial and eco-
nomic goals. On this issue, the
role of informed judgment is at
the heart of monetary policy de-
cision making.
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